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A B S T R A C T
We present experimental data from the Heaven-Dictator Game, a generalization of the Dictator Game that in-
vestigates the overstatement of inequality reduction in the motivation of social preferences. Two players start
with equal endowments and the Heaven-Dictator player, without incurring any pecuniary cost or profit, chooses
among increasing, decreasing or maintaining the earnings of the recipient player. Any choice except for the
status quo generates unequal payoffs. The design avoids the experimenter demand effect of the standard “give
only” version while simultaneously allowing participants to manifest antisocial preferences, inequity reduction
or retaliation cannot be called for as motives. We find that the majority (75.4%) of subjects choose to increase
their partners’ earnings; there is a non-negligible 24.6% of subjects that either choose the status quo (11.9%) or
to decrease (12.7%) others’ earnings. Based on the psychological literature on music as a mood-inducing sti-
mulus and on the effects of mood on helping behavior, we study the effect of exposure to different types of music
on the Heaven-Dictator choices. Although at first sight observed distributional preferences are independent of
the music condition, further analysis reveals that classical music seems to foster social welfare rather than
inequality aversion.
1. Introduction
Experiments reveal that individuals have other-regarding pre-
ferences. Models of social preferences incorporate this fact by assuming
diverse individuals’ motivations based on either outcome-distribution
of payoffs across players- or intentions (Cooper and Kagel, 2017). On
one hand, distributional motivations include inequity aversion and
social welfare. Inequity aversion models assume that individuals dislike
unequal distributions. Social welfare models assume that individuals
like to increase social surplus, particularly helping those worst off. On
the other hand, intentions-based motivations focus on reciprocity. Re-
ciprocity models assume that individuals mainly react to others’ beha-
vior towards them. In experimental games, however, social preferences’
motivations are usually mingled. In general, inequality reduction has
been overstated as motivation for Pareto-modifying behavior and, in
particular, its conjunction with negative reciprocity -retaliation- for
Pareto-damaging behavior (Charness & Rabin, 2002).1 Moreover, re-
ciprocity is claimed to be a stronger motivation than distributional
preferences (Cooper & Kagel, 2017, p. 227).
We present a modified Dictator Game (DG), the Heaven Dictator
Game (HDG), to study Pareto-modifying behavior that: first, is not
driven by inequality reduction or retaliation; second, unlike the most
commonly studied games, generates inequality; and third, does not
interfere with self-interest. The HDG allows individuals to exhibit a
complete range of distributional preferences.
In the two-player DG, the dictator splits an amount of money with
the receiver, who has no say in the matter. Therefore, self-interest
conflicts with distributional preferences, and reciprocity is expelled. In
the HDG, players start with equal payoffs and the Heaven Dictator (HD)
player chooses among maintaining, increasing or decreasing the re-
cipient's payoff at no pecuniary own cost or benefit. Hence, self-interest
and inequality reduction are barred as countervailing motives. Self-in-
terest is excluded because the HD player's payoff is invariant
throughout choices. Inequality reduction is dismissed because any
choice of the HD player other than the status quo, generates inequality
(difference seeking behavior) and modifies social surplus. The HDG tests
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for the presence of Pareto-damaging behavior that generates advanta-
geous inequality and Pareto-improving behavior that generates dis-
advantageous inequality.
The HDG allows both social and antisocial preferences to emerge.
Thus, it addresses the criticism that the commonly observed generosity
in the DG might result from either being the only available action or a
willingness to appear fair, i.e., a sort of experimenter demand effect2
(Bardsley, 2008; Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007; Dana, Cain, & Dawes,
2006; List, 2007). The literature on taking games explores this possi-
bility (see Section 2.1).
We present an experimental design that challenges the robustness of
the distributional preferences elicited hereby to changes in emotional
states. In many churches and other religious or social contexts in which
charitable giving takes place, music is played live or from a record,
presumably creating the appropriate atmosphere for the emergence of
positive feelings. It is a common strategy by marketing practitioners to
use music in supermarkets and other types of outlets as a means of
promoting buying and spending behavior (North, Hargreaves, &
McKendrick, 1999). Video games where antisocial behavior is played
out have background music too. Distinct music styles accompany dis-
tinct individuals’ behaviors. Given that the HDG analyses the prevailing
shift in other-regarding preferences when individuals can exhibit both
social and antisocial sides, the question arises on whether music may
have an effect on it.
In order to challenge the robustness of our findings to differences in
the mood states of HDs, we have exposed subjects to two alternative
stimuli environments. In one of them, classical music is heard while in
another, modern commercial pop music is played on the loudspeakers
of the lab. Classical and modern music treatments are performed and
compared to behavior under no music at all. Both the classical and
modern music treatments were run using a specifically designed se-
quence of pieces, recorded in a professional studio for the purposes of
this project.3 Both sequences consist of music parts (not complete
songs) which follow each other in a smooth, controlled and similar
across treatments way. The classical music used here was selected from
a library of much shorter pieces (longer versions were used for realism,
to resemble real-life environments with music) which have been clas-
sified and are used in psychology research as stimuli causing pleasant or
very pleasant feelings to the listener (see, e.g., Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008;
Roda, Canazza, & De Poli, 2014; Västfjäll, 2002). The modern music
material used was chosen among popular contemporaneous pop and
rock songs; the purpose was to expose subjects to a more familiar en-
vironment than that provided by classical music, particularly given the
experimental subject pool, and in line with commercial and leisure
settings (North, Hargreaves, & McKendrick, 1999) where background
modern music is used to induce good mood.
Lastly, following research suggesting that faster decisions increase
contributions in public good games (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012) and
seem to underlie extreme altruistic acts (Rand & Epstein, 2014), we also
explore how the time taken by the HDs to make their choices affects
their distributional preferences.
Our results show that the majority of participants choose to max-
imize social surplus despite putting themselves behind, but there is a
non-negligible 24.6% that either choose the status quo (11.9%), or to
minimize social surplus putting themselves ahead (12.7%). Overall, it
seems that observed distributional preferences are independent of the
musical condition. However, strict Pareto-improving behavior seems
more likely when classical music plays, when decisions are taken faster,
and when subjects are males.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 section summarizes the
relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the utility function of the HD.
The experimental design and procedures are described in Section 4.
Section 5 highlights the main results. Section 6 concludes. Instructions
to subjects are in the appendix.
2. Literature review
This section is divided in two parts, one dedicated to revise the
experimental literature on the main DG and other versions of it; the
other subsection briefly reviews the main references on music and be-
havior.
2.1. Dictator Game and modified versions
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) initiate the DG experimental
paradigm by removing incentives for strategic behavior from the ulti-
matum game. Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994) further
refine the game.4 In the DG, two players are randomly matched and
assigned the role of dictator versus recipient. In the DG, a dictator
player receives a certain amount of money and chooses how to split that
amount between herself and the recipient. The recipient (tacitly) ac-
cepts the dictator choice. Over 25 years of experimental research with
the DG shows that the majority choice is not consistent with the payoff
maximization hypothesis: dictators give, on average, 28.35% of the
money (Engel, 2011, p. 588).
Standard explanations of dictator behavior advocate for some kind
of other-regarding preferences, ranging from inequity aversion (Bolton,
1991; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), altruism
(Andreoni & Miller, 2002), egocentrism (Cox, Friedman, & Gjerstad,
2007) to Rawlsian “social welfare” preferences (Charness &
Rabin, 2002). However, Bardsley (2008) posits an alternative ex-
planation and claims that generous dictator behavior is due to the ex-
perimental setting, primarily because giving is the only possible action
in the dictator game. In fact, this last explanation is further explored by
the literature on burning games (Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink &
Herrmann, 2011; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2003) and on taking
games (Bardsley, 2008; Korenok, Millner, & Razzolini, 2014; List,
2007). In burning game experiments, where players have the option to
destroy their partners’ earnings or keep the status quo, players do de-
stroy others’ earnings in consonance with basic ideas of fairness (in-
equity aversion) and self-protection.
To further explore inequity aversion as a source of dictator gener-
osity, List (2007) and Bardsley (2008), contemporaneously and in-
dependently, initiate the taking-games literature by allowing the dic-
tator to take money from the passive player. Both authors show that the
enlarged choice domain not only significantly reduces the percentage of
generous dictators and generosity itself, but also that taking money
strongly emerges as a behavioral tendency, even when the passive
player is in disadvantage (Bardsley, 2008) but tempered when earnings
rather than endowments are at stake (List, 2007). Korenok, Millner, and
Razzolini (2014) manipulate the endowments and corroborate these
results.
However, despite previous findings in framing effects,
Dreber et al. (2013) find that dictators’ preferences are mostly invariant
to framings of the game and strategies. Grossman and Eckel (2015) find
that replacing the standard anonymous recipient by a charity erases
differences between taking and giving options. Chowdhury, Jeon, and
Saha (2017) study on gender differences in DG framing effects supports
that the taking frame, with respect to the giving frame, reduces males’
generosity, increases females’, and increases the odds of females’ ega-
litarianism and of males’ selfishness; whereas both genders are equally
generous in the giving frame.
2 This criticism applies also to burning games (see Abbink &
Herrmann, 2011).
3 The sequences are freely available for replication in a scientific context at
the web site of the LEE (www.lee.uji.es). Use for commercial or other purposes
is strictly forbidden. 4 See the meta-analysis by Engel (2011) for details.
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The HDG can also be understood as a DG with delegation and
without punishment.5 Participants may consider that the experimenter
has delegated the decision to keep or vary the recipient's payoff to the
HD.6 In Hamman, Loewenstein, and Weber (2010), authors observe that
delegation drastically reduces dictators’ generosity. Bartling and
Fischbacher (2012), with delegation and punishment, find that dicta-
tors either choose the fair allocation or delegate; delegates choose the
unfair allocation – which favors both themselves and dictators – and get
punished by recipients. Hence, if the HDG is perceived as a delegated
choice, we should observe minimum generosity or, if shifting the blame is
taken to the extreme by the HD, straightforward decrease-choices.
Decision 3 in study 2 of Charness and Grosskopf (2001) is actually
the closest work to ours: Participants choose between one option in-
volving equal payoffs and another option that allows them to set the
recipient's payoff to any point between half and double the dictators’
(including equal payoffs too). They find that 80% of their subjects
choose the social welfare maximizing option. However, in their study
all the participants make their choice before knowing their definitive
role –dictator versus recipient- in the game. In the HDG experiment
presented here, the role as a (heaven) dictator is set before the HD
makes his choice, i.e., the HD has no uncertainty about his end of the
stick, which may affect dictators’ behavior (Iriberri and Rey-
Biel, 2011). A further distinction, other experimental features aside, is
that our HG explicitly defines equal endowments as the starting point
and constitutes their unique distributive choice.
Other close studies fix the dictator payoff while he may either in-
crease (e.g., Ponti and Rodríguez-Lara, 2015) or decrease (Bracht and
Zylbersztejn, 2018) the recipient's. More concretely, Bracht and
Zylbersztejn's (2018) dictator chooses the recipient's payoff between
zero and equal payoffs (10 euros). However, in line with Charness and
Grosskopf (2001), the starting point is not exactly set at equal endow-
ments and each participant plays both roles. 20% of their subjects
choose a recipient's payoff smaller than 10 euros.
In short, the HDG with an invariant payoff, starting with equal
endowments and without role uncertainty, may exhibit a symmetric
range of pro/anti-social preferences, independently of strict selfishness,
and such that any choice other than the starting point generates in-
equality.
2.2. Music and social behavior
North, Tarrant, and Hargreaves (2004) summarize the psychological
literature that investigates the effect of mood on prosocial behavior.
They conclude that, on one hand, positive moods increase helping; on
the other hand, negative moods only foster helping when there are high
benefits and low costs, and reduce helping only when they have been
externally induced or they are not caused by the person being helped.
This research uses several mood induction techniques, among which
music remains rather under-investigated. Our design relates to the la-
boratory study by Fried and Berkowitz (1979) who find that altruism is
more positively related to soothing music than to aversive or no music.
Drawing on the findings above, North, Tarrant, and
Hargreaves (2004) investigate further the role of music as mood in-
ductor. They focus on altruism and whether the role of music is
mediated by the characteristics of the helping task. In their field ex-
periment, subjects in a university gym are exposed to two types of
music (inducing either positive or negative mood), and subsequently
faced with two distinct helping tasks (signing a petition or distributing
leaflets). They find that although the music type is irrelevant in a time-
costless task like signing a petition, it did affect the time-costly task.
Negative-mood music significantly diminishes the willingness to
distribute leaflets. Mood induction was controlled by two ques-
tionnaires after completing the task. Subjects in that study first an-
swered a questionnaire about their perceptions of the music being
played, and then a mood questionnaire.
In economics, evidence supports the effect of mood on probability
assessment (Wright and Bower, 1992), or on individuals’ decisions
(Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004; Schwarz, 2000). Capra (2004, p.
368) mentions that merchants play music to induce their customers a
buying mood and refers to North's research on mood-inducing music. As
a matter of fact, Capra (2004) finds that induced7 positive mood fosters
prosocial behavior in the DG. A recent hypothetical DG study by
Fukui and Toyoshima (2014) finds that dictators allocate more money
to recipients after listening to music they liked than after listening to
music they disliked.
3. The utility function of the HD player
The HD player is given three behavioral options. One option is doing
nothing, in line with strictly self-regarding preferences. The other two
options are in line with some kind of other-regarding preferences: in-
creasing – altruism – versus decreasing – nastiness – the partner's
earnings, without any pecuniary consequences for himself. In the con-
text of Charness and Rabin's (2002) model of social preferences, and
taking into account that in the HDG both players start with equal en-
dowment, we define the preferences of the HD player through the fol-
lowing utility function:
= +U (1 )HD HD R
where UHD and πHD refer to, respectively, the utility and the payoff of
the HD player, and πR refers to the payoff of the recipient. Parameter σ
captures how the recipient's payoff is taken into consideration by the
HD player. Thus, σ>0 for those HD players who choose to increase the
partner's earnings; σ<0 for those who choose to decrease the partner's
earnings; and = 0 for those subjects who choose the status quo.
A positive σ would indicate an individual preference for maximizing
social welfare and a negative σ indicates a preference for minimizing
social welfare. A zero σ would show inequity aversion. Since players in
the HDG have equal endowments and this is common knowledge, in-
equality reduction is dismissed: any choice of the HD player, except for
the status quo, generates inequality (difference seeking behavior) and
modifies social surplus. Hence, only the status quo is consistent with
inequity aversion as unique motivation. The fact that the HD player's
payoff is invariant throughout his choices excludes self-interest.
However, equity aversion cannot be discarded. Increase-choices by the
HD player might be due to equity aversion together with a preference
for being behind. Conversely, decrease-choices by the HD player might
respond to equity aversion with a preference for being ahead.
Furthermore, in the HDG such a linear utility function combined
with a constant HD player's payoff renders relevant only the sign, but
not the precise value of the parameter. A pure social welfare max-
imizing individual would choose the maximum allowed rise in the re-
cipient's payoff. Similarly, a pure social welfare minimizing individual
would choose the maximum allowed decrease in the recipient's payoff.
Strictly positive and negative HD choices generate, on the one hand,
inequality and, on the other hand, affect social welfare.8 Thus, inter-
mediate choices reveal some individual tension between these two
conflicting distributional concerns.
Inequality concerns may be captured either by the model of
5 We thank an anonymous referee for kindly suggesting this possibility.
6 Even if this were the case, the delegated choice ranges from increasing to
decreasing the recipient's payoff.
7 Mood is induced by memory elicitation and experience of success/failure.
8 More particularly, when the HD player chooses to increase the recipient
payoff, social welfare increases at the expense of generating disadvantageous
inequality for himself (HD goes behind). When the HD chooses to decrease the
recipient payoff, social welfare decreases while generating advantageous in-
equality for himself (HD goes ahead).
A. García-Gallego, et al. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 82 (2019) 101449
3
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or by the Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000). Social
welfare concerns may be of the form of maximizing total payoffs – ef-
ficiency –, or maximizing the minimum payoff – maximin preferences.
The HDG implies a tension between these two conflicting motivations
regarding distributional preferences. If this is the case, one may assume
some sort of single-peaked preferences utility function and the HDG
may be understood as a social preferences’ peak revealing game. That
is, the HD choice reveals his social preferences’ peak, i.e., the payoff
difference (either disadvantageous when increasing, or advantageous
when decreasing) that maximizes his utility, given his constant payoff.
We may consider the following adaptation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s
social preference model,9 where m captures the payoff difference that
the HD player is willing to accept and, hence, determines his choice:
= +U e e m(choice ) max{ , }HD HD R R
= + >e choicewhere andR HD
= = = =e e e e e eendowments ( , ) such that andHD R HD R HD
In the next section we present the experimental design and para-
meters of the HDG, which will allow us to further describe the discrete
choice model we estimate in Section 5.2.
4. Experimental design
All sessions were run in the LEE (Laboratorio de Economía
Experimental) at the Universitat Jaume I (Castellón, Spain). Altogether,
252 students took part in this experiment. Participants were students of
different disciplines, and were recruited through the online recruitment
system for economic experiments, ORSEE.
At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects were ran-
domly paired receiving 10 euros each. The computer assigned a role to
each player: player 1 or 2. Player 1 was the HD player and had to
choose among three options: maintaining, increasing or decreasing the
earnings of the passive partner player 2. The set of alternatives for
player 1 was =choice { 4, 2, 0, 2, 4}HD . For example, choosing the
alternative “−4” implies decreasing by four euros the passive player's
earnings, while choosing “2” means increasing the passive player's
earnings by two euros. Initial endowments in our HDG do not depend
on players’ choices. Therefore, earnings for the HD player are 10 euros,
while the passive player earns 10 euros plus/minus the amount chosen
by the partner.
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At
the beginning of each session, subjects’ instructions were shown in the
computer screen, and read aloud by the experimenter.10 Each session
lasted about one hour. On average, subjects earned 14 euros, including
a 3 euros show-up fee.
In order to test for the robustness of our results with respect to
variations in the subjects’ emotional state, we implemented the ex-
periment under three treatments, varying subjects’ exposure to con-
tinuous musical stimuli. In the baseline, no music was played during the
session. In the second treatment, a sequence of ‘classical music’ crea-
tions were played, chosen from a list of pieces which have been studied
and calibrated to be effective as stimuli causing strong positive emo-
tions (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008; Västfjäll, 2002). For the third treatment,
a similar list has been created and put together in a professional studio
(SONO S.L.), to create a similar sequence of pieces falling under the
heading ‘contemporary Pop and Rock music’.
We denote our treatments without music (baseline), classical music
and modern music. The classical music pieces were selected from music
psychology indexation in terms of the emotional arousal and plea-
santness they induce: Carmen (Bizet), Suite de Peer Gynt (Grieg),
Moldavia (Smetana), Meditation (Massenet), Sonata n17 (Beethoven),
Nutcracker (Tchaicovsky), Bridal Chorus (Warner), September
(Strauss), Scherezade (Korsakoff). The modern music pieces were se-
lected by a professional musician following the “good and commercial”
criteria;11 Billie Jean (Michael Jackson), Toxic (Britney Spears), Back to
Black (Amy Winehouse), Rock the house (Chemical Brothers), Grace
Kelly (Mika), Whiskey Bar (The Doors), What's up (4 Non Blondes), I
Feel Good (James Brown), among others.
5. Results
5.1. General overview
As the HD players are the only subjects taking a decision in the
HDG, there are 126 observations (40% men) in total: 36 without music
and 90 observations under any music, from which 48 belong to the
classical music treatment and 42 to the modern music one.
Table 1 summarizes the frequencies, mean and median choices by
the HD player under each treatment, and the pooled data for the con-
dition “any music”.
First, considering the whole sample, the overwhelming majority of
subjects, 95 of them (75.4%), do increase their partner's earnings in line
with pro-social other-regarding preferences, or with equity aversion.
That is, in terms of the simplified version of the Charness and
Rabin (2002)’s social preferences model discussed in the introduction,
our data show that σ>0.
However, we also observe some status quo choices as well as a re-
duction in the recipient's earnings. Specifically, 15 (11.9%) HD players
choose the status quo and are consistent with inequity aversion models.
Moreover, 16 out of 126 (12.7%) HD subjects choose to reduce their
partner's endowment being consistent with antisocial preferences or
equity aversion. In the next subsection we describe and report the
discrete choice that approximates the HDG adaptation of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999).
Although we observe a larger tendency to reduce the recipient's
earnings in the treatments with music, the difference is not significant
( = =p13.06, 0.110).(8)2 Hence, at first sight, music does not affect
significantly the decision making of HD subjects. The histograms de-
picted in Fig. 1 and the box plots in Fig. 2 offer an overall view of these
results.
However, examining in more depth the ‘without music’ versus the
‘classical music’ treatments, where the major discrepancy is clearly
shown in Fig. 1 below, there is a relationship significant only at 10%
between HD choices and classical music ( = =p7.8, 0.099)(4)2 .
Given the discrete nature of our data, the appropriate test is the
Epps-Singleton13 which compares the empirical characteristic functions
(Moffat, 2016). The Epps-Singleton test ( = =W p8.846, 0.0652 ) rejects
that both distributions are identical. It seems, therefore, that listening
to classical music instead of none may have an influence on the HD
players’ choices.
5.2. Estimation of a discrete choice model
We follow an analogous approach to Engelmann and Strobel (2004)
and Ponti and Rodríguez-Lara (2015) and use a discrete choice model in
order to estimate the parameters of the HDG adaptation of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999)’s social preferences model presented in Section 3.
Each choice made by the HD player from the set
=choice { 4, 2, 0, 2, 4}HD , determines a final allocation (πHD, πR).
Let (10, 6) be the pure antisocial (PAS) allocation; (10, 8) the relative
antisocial (RAS) allocation; (10, 10) the inequity averse (IA) allocation;
(10, 12) the relative social welfare (RSW) allocation; and (10, 14) the
9 One could also define it with respect to total payoffs instead of just the
recipient's payoff.
10 See the instructions in the Appendix.
11 This material is available upon request.
13 Similar to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test with continuous data.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the HDG experimental data.
Treatment (Obs.) Choice frequencies (%) Mean Median
−4 −2 0 2 4
Without music (36) 2 (5.5) 0- 7 (19.4) 12 (33.3) 15 (41.6) 2.1 2
Any music (90) 7 (7.7) 7 (7.7) 8 (8.8) 20 (22.2) 48 (53.3) 2.1 4
Classical music (48) 5 (10.4) 2 (4.2) 4 (8.3) 8 (16.6) 29 (60.4) 2.25 4
Modern music (42) 2 (4.7) 5 (11.9) 4 (9.5) 12 (28.5) 19 (45.2) 1.95 2









-4 -2 0 2 4 -4 -2 0 2 4 -4 -2 0 2 4
Without music Classical music Modern music







Without music Classical music Modern music
Fig. 2. Box plots of each treatment distribution.
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pure social welfare (PSW) allocation. In the context of the HDG adap-
tation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s utility function, m measures each
individual's preferences peak or his social preferences type, within the
PAS versus PSW spectrum housed by the game. One would assume that
individuals with m≥4 would choose to increase by four the recipient's
payoff; individuals choosing two have a nearby social preferences’ peak,
suggesting an interplay between maximizing social welfare and mini-
mizing disadvantageous inequality; individuals who maximize utility
with equal payoffs would choose the status quo. Likewise, individuals
wanting to be ahead would choose to decrease the recipient's payoff
and, here again there is maximum advantage that they are willing to
take. That is, each individual's peak m depends on the subjective in-
terplay between social welfare and inequality aversion.
Like Engelmann and Strobel (2004), we consider three main moti-
vations: selfishness (SELF), social welfare motives, and inequality
aversion concerns. The social welfare motivation may take two alter-
native forms, efficiency (EFF) or maximin preferences (MM). Inequality
aversion concerns may be of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s types: ad-
vantageous inequality (FSA), disadvantageous inequality (FSD), or
strict inequality (FSS); or of the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)’s effi-
ciency, reciprocity and competition (ERC) type. In our HDG, these
motivations are measured as:
=SELF 10
= +EFF 10 R
=MM min {10, }R
=FSD max { 10, 0}R
=FSA max {10 , 0}R






Table 2 shows how the differentiated motivations characterize each
HD choice (allocation), from which we can infer which allocation is
predicted by each motivation.
Because the HD's payoff is invariant, self-motivation is accordingly
so. Efficiency predicts that the HD will choose the PSW allocation. MM
preferences cannot discriminate between the IA, RSW and PSW allo-
cations. FSD is not able to discriminate among the PAS, RAS and IA
allocations. Moreover, FSA is not able to discriminate among the IA,
RSW and PSW allocation, exactly as MM preferences. To correct the
collinearity problem between FSD and FSA, similarly to Engelmann and
Strobel (2004, p. 865), we define an aggregate measure of inequality
assuming equal weights to FSA and FSD. We name this measure ‘Fehr
and Schmidt Strict’ (FSS). Finally, ERC predicts the IA allocation as FSS
(another collinearity problem between ERC and FSS); however, ERC
allows for differences between being ahead and being behind. In short,
EFF and ERC are the only motivations that clearly distinguish among
the HDG allocations.
Given the structure of the HDG, motivations of the same type –social
welfare vs inequality aversion– are quite correlated as Table 2 suggests,
which deter us from including all of them together (in fact, none of
them is significant). Since the HD's choice results from the tension be-
tween the two conflicting motives of social welfare and inequality
aversion, we estimate a model with one social welfare motivation (EFF
or MM) and with one inequality aversion motivation (FSS or ERC).
Table 3 summarizes the discrete choice models of each particular
choice/allocation j depending on the precise distributional concerns.
Like Engelmann and Strobel (2004), we estimate McFadden's (1980)
choice model, i.e. a conditional logit model (e.g., see Moffat, 2016).
More concretely, we consider the two distributional preferences con-
flicting motivations, social welfare and inequality aversion as alter-
native (allocation) specific variables. Since each HD subject makes only
one choice, no individual parameters can be estimated, but just the
parameters of an average subject. Individual heterogeneity will be cap-
tured by the error term. With the conditional logit model, the prob-







g PAS RAS IA RSW PSW HD{ , , , , }
j
g
Table 4 shows the results both for aggregated data (pooling ob-
servations) and differentiating by treatment. As expected, an increase in
social welfare increases HD's utility whereas further inequality aversion
reduces it. However, inequality concerns are not significant if the social
welfare concerns are captured by efficiency, i.e., it seems that efficiency
captures most of the variability of our discrete data. With maximin
preferences as social welfare concern, both types of inequality aversion
concerns have a significantly negative effect on the HD's utility. More
concretely, in model 3 (column 4), an increase in MM rises the prob-
ability of choosing larger choices by 71.3% [(1.713−1)×100],
whereas an increase in FSS inequality reduces that probability by 31.2%
[(0.688− 1)× 100].14
In Table 5 we present an enriched model in which we add subject-
specific variables, namely gender (male), choice-time (measured by z-
Tree and named time for short) and the categorical variable music. As
before, inequality concerns are not significant when efficiency is taken
as social welfare concern. However, when social welfare concerns are
measured by maximin preferences, both conflicting motivations have a
significant, and in the expected direction, impact on utility: social
welfare has a positive effect, and inequality aversion has a negative
effect. For instance, in model 4 (last column of Table 5), an increase in
efficiency rises the probability of choosing higher choices by 183.4%
[(2.834− 1)× 100]; whereas an increase in ERC inequality reduces
this probability by 20.6% [(0.794−1)×100].
Interestingly, with respect to the PAS allocation and independently
of the model: (a) the IA and the RSW allocations have worse odds of
being chosen when classical music is being played (10% significant), as
captured by Fig. 1; (b) the PSW allocation has better odds of being
chosen by males (significant at 10%) and the shorter the time taken to
make the choice (1% significant).
Table 2
HDG motivations per HD's choice allocation.
HD choice allocation= (πHD,
πR)
Self Social welfare Inequality aversion
EFF MM FSD FSA FSS ERC
PAS= (10, 6) 10 16 6 0 −4 −4 −12.5
RAS= (10, 8) 10 18 8 0 −2 −2 −5.55
IA= (10, 10) 10 20 10 0 0 0 0
RSW= (10, 12) 10 22 10 −2 0 −2 −4.55
PSW= (10, 14) 10 24 10 −4 0 −4 −8.33
Table 3
Discrete choice models.
Social welfare Inequality aversion
FSS ERC
Efficiency Model 1:
= +U EFF FSSj j jHD 1 1
Model 2:
= +U EFF ERCj j jHD 2 2
Maximin Model 3:
= +U MM FSSj j jHD 3 3
Model 4:
= +U MM ERCj j jHD 4 4
14 The most noticeable difference between pooled and per treatment results is
that in model 3, MM versus FSS, the inequality aversion concern is only 10%
significant in the ‘without music’ treatment.
A. García-Gallego, et al. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 82 (2019) 101449
6
5.3. Music condition
In this section, we further explore the impact of classical music on
the HD choices. First, this effect is more significant when pooling de-
creasing-choices (i.e., −4 and −2) ( = =p7.28, 0.060)(3)2 . Then, we
estimate the effect of classical music on the HD choices by an ordered
logit model. The model estimates HD choices as a function of the ca-
tegorical variable music and time; the variable male is also included but,
given the number observations, is no longer significant.
We have considered all HD choices and also restricted the analysis
to non-decreasing choices (i.e., when the HD maintains or increases the
recipient's payoff). Table 6 shows the estimation results and confirms
that, when the analysis is restricted to non-decreasing choices, there is a
1% significant positive effect of classical music on the ordered-logit
odds of choosing the PSW allocation in comparison with the joint ca-
tegories of RSW and IA.
Penultimate row 5 shows that the possibility of choosing to increase
the recipient payoff by 4 with respect to the combined choices of in-
creasing by 2 or maintaining the recipient payoff, i.e., of choosing the
PSW allocation rather than the combined RSW and IA allocations, rises
by 287.2%, [(3.872 − 1) × 100], when classical music is being played,
and reduces by 11.4%, [(0.886 − 1) × 100], when choice-time in-
creases by one second. In the last row, with male as a regressor, the
possibility of increasing the recipient payoff by 4 rises by 252.8%
Table 4
Structural model with a allocation specific variables only.
Conditional logit model estimates Odds ratio (p-value)
EFF vs FSS EFF vs ERC MM vs FSS MM vs ERC
Pooling observations
Social welfare 1.31*** (0.000) 1.335*** (0.000) 1.713*** (0.000) 2.035*** (0.000)
Inequality aversion 0.901 (0.161) 0.957 (0.137) 0.688*** (0.000) 0.833*** (0.000)
Wald chi2(2) 68.57 (0.000) 68.84(0.000) 68.57(0.000) 68.36(0.000)
Without music treatment
Social welfare 1.44***(0.001) 1.399***(0.000) 2.093***(0.001) 2.035***(0.000)
Inequality aversion 1.166(0.312) 1.054(0.379) 0.806*(0.050) 0.895***(0.040)
Wald chi2(2) 14.52(0.001) 14.86(0.001) 14.52(0.001) 15.09(0.001)
Classical music treatment
Social welfare 1.27***(0.000) 1.353***(0.000) 1.608***(0.000) 2.113***(0.000)
Inequality aversion 0.709(0.010) 0.873(0.009) 0.560***(0.000) 0.755***(0.000)
Wald chi2(2) 36.22(0.000) 35.79(0.000) 36.22(0.000) 35.17(0.000)
Modern music treatment
Social welfare 1.288***(0.000) 1.305***(0.000) 1.659***(0.000) 1.913***(0.000)
Inequality aversion 0.932(0.572) 0.973(0.581) 0.724***(0.003) 0.857***(0.004)
Wald chi2(2) 19.32(0.000) 19.25(0.000) 19.32(0.000) 18.98(0.000)
Table 5
Structural model with individual specific variables.
Conditional logit model estimates Odds ratio (p-value)
EFF vs FSS EFF vs ERC MM vs FSS MM vs ERC
Allocation (alternative) specific variables
Social welfare 1.515*** (0.001) 1.522*** (0.000) 2.295*** (0.001) 2.834*** (0.000)
Inequality aversion 0.954 (0.793) 0.973 (0.702) 0.630*** (0.002) 0.794*** (0.002)
Individual (case) specific variables: PAS base allocation
RAS Male 2.072 (0.506) 2.102 (0.497) 2.072 (0.506) 2.174 (0.478)
Time 0.960(0.612) 0.960(0.619) 0.960(0.612) 0.965(0.669)
Classical 0.203(0.181) 0.218(0.205) 0.203(0.181) 0.244(0.237)
Modern 1.372(0.781) 1.482(0.733) 1.372(0.781) 1.672(0.652)
IA Male 1.687(0.605) 1.743(0.582) 1.687(0.605) 1.772(0.571)
Time 1.028(0.625) 1.031(0.597) 1.028(0.625) 1.032(0.581)
Classical 0.116*(0.075) 0.127*(0.088) 0.116*(0.075) 0.131*(0.091)
Modern 0.340(0.410) 0.378(0.458) 0.340(0.410) 0.394(0.474)
RSW Male 1.180(0.861) 1.196(0.847) 1.177(0.861) 1.177(0.861)
Time 1.000(0.999) 1.001(0.982) 1.000(0.999) 0.999(0.997)
Classical 0.139*(0.073) 0.150*(0.081) 0.138*(0.073) 0.147*(0.077)
Modern 0.531(0.598) 0.577(0.642) 0.531(0.598) 0.565(0.629)
PSW Male 4.458*(0.098) 4.515*(0.094) 4.458*(0.098) 4.526*(0.093)
Time 0.742***(0.000) 0.742***(0.000) 0.742***(0.000) 0.743***(0.000)
Classical 0.531(0.556) 0.568(0.596) 0.531(0.556) 0.583(0.609)
Modern 1.072(0.954) 1.152(0.907) 1.072(0.954) 1.182(0.889)
Wald chi2(10) 84.28(0.000) 84.57(0.000) 84.28(0.000) 84.65(0.000)
Table 6
Ordered logit model odds ratio (p-value) with music as categorical variable.
HD choices Classical music Modern music Time Male LR chi2 test (p-value)
1.592 (0.264) 1.003 (0.994) – – 1.71(0.426)
All 1.884(0.153) 1.017(0.969) 0.891***(0.001) – 17.27(0.001)
1.711(0.216) 1.108(0.810) 0.886***(0.001) 1.912*(0.081) 20.39(0.000)
2.994**(0.020) 1.593(0.308) – – 5.64(0.060)
choiceHD≥ 0 3.872***(0.006) 1.755(0.233) 0.886***(0.001) – 20.80(0.000)
3.528**(0.012) 1.845(0.198) 0.885***(0.002) 1.790(0.171) 22.72(0.000)
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[(3.528 − 1) × 100] when classical music is being played and de-
creases by 11.5% [(0.885 − 1) × 100] when choice-time increases by
one second.
Thus, the social welfare concern is more likely to prevail over the
inequality aversion concern, hence boosting the PSW allocation, with a
classical music background.
6. Conclusions
We have used a modified dictator game, the Heaven Dictator
Game (HDG) to study distributional preferences –pure social vs anti-
social preferences– removing demand effect, inequality reduction and
reciprocity as motivations. We find that, in a context where individuals
are given the option to exhibit whatever type of distributional pre-
ferences they have, subjects mainly exhibit altruistic preferences, that
is, their utility increases with the other payoff (Cox, 2007). Hence, in
the context of Charness and Rabin's (2002) model, our average Heaven
Dictator (HD) subject assigns a positive value to the recipient's payoff.
However, not all HD subjects of our sample choose the maximum al-
lowed increase in the recipients’ payoff. This reveals some tension between
two conflicting distributional concerns, social welfare and inequity aver-
sion. Hence, a HDG adaptation of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model seems
better suited and we have approximated it by estimating a discrete choice
model in quite a similar fashion to Engelmann and Strobel (2004). We
consider two types of social welfare concerns, efficiency (total payoffs)
and maximin preferences; and two types of inequity aversion concerns,
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) strict inequity aversion (Engelmann &
Strobel, 2004) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) efficiency, reciprocity and
competition model. First, we find that efficiency as social welfare concern,
and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) efficiency, reciprocity and competition
model as inequality aversion concern, clearly differentiate the HDG allo-
cations. Secondly, both distributional concerns have a significant, and in
the predicted sense, impact on the HD utility when the social welfare
concern is of the maximin preferences type. Moreover, the social welfare
concern seems to dominate the shorter the time taken to make the choice,
which may suggest an emotion-laden choice, and with male HDs.
We have checked the robustness of our results with respect to var-
iations in the subjects’ emotional state varying subjects’ exposure to
continuous musical stimuli: no music played during the session, a
sequence of classical music causing strong positive emotions, and a
sequence of contemporary pop and rock music more in line with that in
commercial and leisure settings (North, Hargreaves, & McKendrick,
1999) to induce moods/feelings. In a similar way to North, Tarrant, and
Hargreaves's (2004) results on the time-costless task, we do not observe
an overall effect of music on HD choices. Overall, it seems that their
distributional preferences, as defined in our experiment, are in-
dependent of background music. However, if we pool the observations
attending to whether HDs choose to maintain or increase versus de-
crease their partners’ earnings, we observe that weakly prosocial be-
havior is significantly more frequent under the ‘classical music’ condi-
tion than under the ‘without music’ condition. Additional non-
parametric and parametric analyses reveal that classical music may tilt
the distributional preferences balance in favor of social welfare con-
cerns with respect to inequality aversion concerns.
Further research may extent the choice range of the HD player in
order to estimate a sort of maximum payoff difference or social pre-
ferences’ peak, on both sides of the distributional spectrum, and aside of
selfish concerns and exchange rates. The HDG captures a distributional
preferences balance between the conflicting motivations of social wel-
fare and inequality aversion. Hence, research may continue to explore
what factors may tilt the balance towards one of the motivations.
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Appendix: Instructions to subjects
This is the screenshot that shows the original instructions in Spanish
received by each subject when the experiment starts. A translation to
English follows.
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"In this task each participant receives 10 euros.
Each participant will be randomly matched with another participant
in this session.
Each pair of subjects comprises two randomly assigned types of
player: Player A and Player B.
Player A:
• Chooses how many euros to add/subtract from player B's earnings.
• This decision does not affect his own payment. That is, each player A
will earn 10 euros.
Player B:
• Waits until Player A decides.
• Has a payoff equal to 10 euros plus/minus player A's choice.
• That is, player B's earnings depend on player A's choice.
• Please confirm by clicking OK.”
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